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INTRODUCTION
In its decision in Weatherford v. Bursey,2 the United States
Supreme Court considered whether governmental intrusion in-
to counsel-client consultations constituted an infringement of
the right to the effective representation of counsel3 when con-
sidered without regard to intent or actual prejudice caused by
the intrusion. The Fourth Circuit held that all deliberate govern-
mental intrusions into client-counsel consultations were uncon-
stitutional "irrespective of any showing of substantial prejudice
... and in dicta concluded that "whenever the prosecution
knowingly arranges or permits intrusion into the attorney-client
relationship the right to counsel is sufficiently endangered to
require reversal and a new trial."'5 On appeal the Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the sixth amendment was not vio-
lated where there was no tainted evidence used in the trial of the
case, no communication of defense strategy to the prosecution,
and no purposeful intrusion by the government or its agents. 6
The purpose of this note is to examine the propriety of this
decision, in light of previous decisions and the impact on the
lawyer-client relation.
On March 19, 1970 Weatherford, an undercover agent of the
state of South Carolina, and Bursey, the plaintiff in the instant
case, vandalized a selective service office in Columbia. Upon
information supplied by Weatherford, he and Bursey were ar-
1. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 306 (1966).
2. 97 S. Ct. 837 (1977).
3. The sixth amendment right to "effective assistance" of counsel was
recognized in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), and incorporated by the
fourteenth amendment in Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), where the
right was declared "fundamental and essential to a fair trial." Id. at 342.
4. Bursey v. Weatherford, 528 F.2d 483, 487 (4th Cir. 1975).
5. Id. at 486.
6. 97 S. Ct. at 845. The court also reversed the Court of Appeals' ruling that
Bursey's right to a fair trial had been abridged by the prosecution's failure to
disclose Weatherford's identity. In so deciding the Court relied on Wardius v.
Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973), to refute the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
rested for state criminal offenses. At the request of Bursey's
counsel and in order to continue his undercover work on other
matters, Weatherford met with Bursey and his counsel to dis-
cuss the approaching trial.7 Weatherford did not communicate
any information concerning the trial plans to his superiors or
the prosecution. 8 Bursey was convicted, fled the state, ap-
prehended and returned to South Carolina, where he served his
sentence without appeal or attempts at post conviction relief.'
Alleging that he had been deprived of the effective assistance
of counsel, Bursey brought civil suit in federal court" pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.11 The district judge found that no "gross"
intrusions into the attorney-client relationship had been made
since the conferences had been attended only to allow Agent
Weatherford to maintain his cover, and Bursey had not been
prejudiced since the information gained at the conferences had
not been communicated to the prosecution. 2 Judgment against
the plaintiff was entered and appealed.
The Fourth Circuit Court, although accepting the district
court's findings of fact, reversed the decision relying upon the
brief per curiam opinions of Black v. United States1 3 and O'B-
rien v. United States.14 The court interpreted these decisions as
establishing a per se rule requiring reversal and a new trial "...
whenever the prosecution knowingly arranges or permits intru-
sion into the attorney-client relationship . . . ."15 It rejected the
contention of the appellee, Weatherford, that "gross" intrusion
into the attorney-client relationship is necessary for a violation
of sixth amendment rights requiring reversal. 6
7. 97 S. Ct. at 839-840.
8. Id. The district court also found that at these meetings Bursey and his
attorney raised the question of whether a possible informer might be used to
prove the case, but Weatherford never made any statements as to his being an
informer.
9. Bursey v. Weatherford, 528 F.2d 483, 485 (4th Cir. 1975).
10. Id. at 484.
11. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (originally enacted
as Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22 § 1, 17 Stat. 13) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom or usage, of any State of Territory, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within thejurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress.
12. Bursey v. Weatherford, 528 F.2d 483, 486 (4th Cir. 1975).
13. 385 U.S. 26 (1966).
14. 386 U.S. 345 (1967).
15. 528 F.2d at 486. See generally 54 N.C.L. REV. 1276.
16. Id.; but see United States v.Rispo, 460 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1972). This rule
was apparently derived from the statement in Hoffa v. United States that Cald-
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In Black, after the denial of certiorari by the Supreme
Court, 17 the Solicitor General volunteered information that the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, pursuant to an unrelated case,
had installed a listening device in Black's hotel suite. The device
had monitored exchanges between Black and his attorney. In-
formation from the intercept had been relayed to the prosecu-
tion which was unaware that attorney-client conferences were
among the sources of the information received. The Solicitor
General reported that nothing in the reports had been used by
the prosecution.1 8 In response to the petition for rehearing, the
Solicitor General suggested that a determination be made by an
adversary hearing to determine whether the conviction should
stand. In view of the circumstances, the Court held that justice
required a new trial to allow Black the opportunity to ensure
that no inadmissible evidence be used in his prosecution. 19 The
Court concluded that a new trial was necessary for the "...
removal of any doubt as to Black's receiving a fair trial with full
consideration being given to the new evidence."20
O'Brien involved the monitoring of attorney-client conversa-
tions by the Federal Bureau of Investigation using a mic-
rophone installed in a commercial establishment owned by an
acquaintenance of the accused. The contents of the monitored
conversation were never communicated outside of the F.B.I.
The Solicitor General voluntarily revealed the intrusion in re-
sponse to a petition for certiorari. The judgement was vacated
and the case remanded citing Black.2'
At issue in the cases was the proper procedure for the deter-
mination of whether tainted evidence had been used in the trials
of the accused. Taken together the decisions indicate that in
federal cases where previously undiscovered illegal intelli-
gence gathering activities are revealed after trial, the optimum
well v. United States, 205 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1953), and Coplon v. United States,
191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952), " ... dealt with
government intrusion of the grossest kind upon the confidential relationship
between the defendant and his counsel." 385 U.S. 293, 306 (1966).
17. 384 U.S. 927 (1966).
18. 385 U.S. at 28.
19. Id. at 28-29.
20. Id. at 29.
21. 386 U.S. at 346.
manner for insuring that inadmissable evidence had not been
used is to grant a new trial.
THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
Justice White, writing for the majority, rejected the lower
court's interpretation of Black and O'Brien. The fourth amend-
ment was given as the basis for holding the evidence to be illegal
rather than a per se exclusionary rule based on the sixth amend-
ment.22 The Court based its conclusion on two factors, the Sol-
icitor General's concession of taint deduced from his willing-
ness to remand and the decision in Silverman v. United
States.23 In Silverman an electronic listening device similar to
that used in O'Brien was held to be an "unauthorized physical
penetration" 24 in violation of the fourth amendment. 25 Justice
White pointed out that no ruling on sixth amendment rights was
made in either the Black or O'Brien cases, but that the deci-
sions were concerning how the determination of prejudice re-
sulting from the eavesdroppings should be made.26 The opinion
concludes that:
If anything is to be inferred from these two cases with respect to the
right to cousel, it is that when conversations with counsel have been
overheard, the constitutionality of the conviction depends on whether
the overheard conversations have produced, directly or indirectly,
any of the evidence offered at trial.27
The majority recognized that a right to confidential communi-
cation exists but ruled that when an intrusion occurs there is no
deprivation of the right unless the government attempted to or
did in fact exploit the counsels of the defendants. It reached this
conclusion after recognizing the obvious prophylactic effective-
ness of the per se rule and balancing it against the necessity of
undercover police work.28
The decision also indicated that "a much stronger case"
would exist if testimony were given concerning the counsels of
the defense, if any of the prosecution's evidence had originated
22. 97 S. Ct. at 841-843. The majority also identified Hoffa v. United States,
385 U.S. 293 (1966), as being relied on in the appellate decision. Id. at 841. The
only discussion given Hoffa in the lower court was the refutation of the "gross-
ness" test proffered by Weatherford. 528 F.2d at 486. Justice White's opinion
explains that Hoffa assumed for the sake of argument, without deciding, the
breach of Hoffa's sixth amendment rights in an earlier trial. 97 S. Ct. 842-843.
23. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
24. Id. at 509.
25. 97 S. Ct. at 841 n.1.
26. Id. at 841-842.
27. Id. at 842.
28. Id. at 844-845. This was basically the argument of the United States in its
brief as amicus curiae. Id. at 843 n.4.
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from the conversations, or had the details been used by or com-
municated to the prosecution. 9 Justice White dismissed as un-
realistic the Court of Appeal's finding that Weatherford was in
fact a member of the prosecution. 30 The Court was further con-
strained by the nature of the investigating authority:
We have no general oversight authority with respect to state police
investigations. We may disapprove an investigatory practice only if it
violates the Constitution; and judged in this light, the Court of Appe-
als' per se rule cuts much too broadly.
3
'
The dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall joined by Justice
Brennan criticized the allowance of the "narrowest of open-
ings" to the practice of spying on attorney-client communica-
tions, citing the threat to the integrity of the adversary system
and the right to the effective assistance of counsel.3 2 The opinion
emphasized the factors important to the right to effective assist-
ance of counsel and the harmful effect of the majority ruling on
this right. Justice Marshall stated,
In my view, the "balance of forces between the accused and his accus-
er" is sharply skewed in favor of the accuser if the Government's key
witnesses are permitted to discover the defense strategy by intercept-
ing attorney-client communications, even if the witnesses cannot di-
vulge the information to the prosecution. With this information, the
witnesses are in a position to formulate in advance answers to anti-
cipated questions, and even to shade their testimony to meet expected
defenses: Furthermore, because of these dangers defendants may be
deterred from exercising their right to communicate with their law-
yers if government witnesses can intrude with impunity so long as
they do not discuss what they learn with the prosecutor.
3 3
The majority's rule requiring intent or disclosure was criticized
as not leaving the needed "'breathing space'" necessary .to the
survival of the sixth amendment in view of the difficulties of
proof involved.34 The dissent also argued that the per se rule
derived by the Court of Appeals "was supported, if not compell-
ed" by Black and O'Brien.35 This argument was based on the
fact that the Court remanded the cases for new trials in spite of
the Solicitor General's statements that no tainted evidence had
been used in the prosecution of the cases.
29. Id. at 843.
30. Id. at 844.
31. Id. at 845.
32. Id. at 847.
33. Id. at 848, (footnote omitted).
34. Id. at 848-849.
35. Id. at 849.
ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION
The majority recognized that a right to confidential communi-
cation exists but ruled that when an intrusion occurs, unless the
government attempted to or did in fact exploit the counsels of
the defense, no deprivation of that right has occurred. It reach-
ed this conclusion after recognizing the obvious prophylactic
effectiveness of the per se rule and balancing it against the
necessity of undercover police work.
While the majority and dissent agreed as to the existence of a
right to the effective assistance of counsel, the dissent found
that the right not only prohibited the use or attempted use of the
attorney-client relationship to the detriment of the client, but
also mandated the maintenance of a sterile environment within
which the relationship could operate. It based its reasoning on
the difficulties of proving intent or disclosure. In response to
this the majority stated,
Nor do we believe that federal or state prosecutors will be so prone to
lie or the difficulties of proof so great that we must always assume not
only that an informant communicates what he learns from an en-
counter with the defendant and his counsel but also that what he
communicates has the potential for detriment to the defendant or
benefit to the prosecutor's case.
36
The reasons for this belief are not spelled out in the decision but
analysis of several hypothetical situations involving undercover
agents present at uninformative defense counsels is underta-
ken. Justice White concludes that in these hypotheticals, even
though no realistic possibility of injury to the defendant or
benefit to the government would exist, the per se rule would
require reversal.37 This would indicate that the majority was
unwilling to accept the presumption of detriment as constitu-
tionally mandated.
The dissent argued for acceptance of the presumption of de-
triment based on intangibles such as the ability of undercover
agents to plan their testimony and the chill that might result
from requiring prejudice or intent. The majority weighed the
requirements of the sixth amendment against the day to day
realities of law enforcement. The Court's exercise of its option
to require retrial in Black and O'Brien was a concession to the
right to counsel. To find this concession constitutionally man-
dated by the sixth and fourteenth amendments is to go much
further. In Mapp v. Ohio3 8 and Miranda v. Arizona39 the Court
36. Id. at 844.
37. Id. at 845.
38. 367 U.S. 643, 651-655 (1961).
39. 384 U.S. 436, 445-458 (1966).
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found that the Constitution did proscribe certain investigative
and prosecutorial procedures. Each case was solidly founded on
a firm factual base. The fears expressed by the dissent fall well
short of the foundations present in Mapp and Miranda.
THE INTRUSION THREAT TO THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
The brief per curiam opinions of Black and O'Brien are scant
authority for any rulings on sixth amendment rights. Lower
court decisions on the issue reveal interesting logic. The First,40
Second,41 Fifth,42 Seventh, 43 Eighth,44 and Ninth45 Circuits have
all required a showing of prejudice or intentional intrusion.
Some find that where the information was arrived at uninten-
tionally, there was no intrusion.46 Others seem to base their
exclusion of tainted evidence on an analogy to search and sei-
zure law which requires suppression of evidence derived by
illegal means unless the evidence can be purged of taint.47 The
circuit court decision in Bursey, its District of Columbia Court
precedents,48 and the Third Circuit49 in requiring neither intent
nor prejudice rely chiefly on the statement in Glasser v. United
States50 concerning the denial of the accused's request for the
undivided assistance of counsel. The Court stated that,
40. Grieco v. Meachum, 533 F.2d 713, 718 (1st Cir. 1976); Taglianetti v.
United States, 398 F.2d 558, 569-571 (1st Cir. 1968). aff'd, 394 U.S. 316 (1969).
41. United States v. Arroyo, 494 F.2d 1316, 1323 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied
419 U.S. 827 (1974); United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1224 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied 417 U.S. 950 (1974); United States v. Lebron, 222 F.2d 531, 534 (2d
Cir. 1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. 876 (1955).
42. United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 425 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied 415
U.S. 960 (1974); United States v. Bullock, 441 F.2d 59, 64 (5th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Zarzour, 432 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1970).
43. United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 364-365, (7th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Balistrieri, 403 F.2d 472, 477-478 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
953 (1971).
44. United States v. Crow Dog, 532 F.2d 1182, 1197 (8th Cir. 1976); South
Dakota v. Long, 465 F.2d 65, 72 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1130 (1973);
Kaufman v. United States, 350 F.2d 408, 416 (8th Cir. 1965), rev'd on other
grounds, 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
45. United States v. Choate, 527 F.2d 748, 751-752 (9th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Scott, 521 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1975); see also 1975 DUKE L.J. 1164.
46. See, e.g., United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1224 (2d Cir. 1973).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Balistrieri, 403 F.2d 472, 478 (7th Cir. 1968).
48. Caldwell v. United States, 205 F.2d 879, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Coplan v.
United States, 191 F.2d 749, 757-760 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
49. United States v. Venuto, 182 F.2d 519, 522 (3d Cir. 1950).
50. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
To determine the precise degree of prejudice sustained by Glasser as a
result of the court's appointment of [his defense attorney] as counsel
for [his co-defendant] is at once difficult and unnecessary. The right to
have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to
allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of preju-
dice arising from denial.
51
The propriety of remand was also attacked by the Supreme
Court of Washington in State v. Cory.52 It pointed out that
information gained in the first trial through intrusion into the
accused's relation with counsel could be used in subsequent
trials. The court therefore concluded that in such cases the
proper remedy is the setting aside of the judgment and dismiss-
al of the charges.
53
The choice of a rule which would preclude the harmful effects
of intrusion on the attorney-client relationship must logically
begin by identifying these effects. There are three major dan-
gers which must be considered: knowledge that the formulation
of his defense may be used as an opportunity to obtain evidence
may deter defendants from the full disclosure necessary in that
situation;5 4 the discovery of defense strategy may give the prose-
cution a tactical advantage at trial;55 evidence may be produced
from the leads obtained at the conferences. 56 The harmful ef-
fects of the intrusion are generally related to the information
acquired thereby. It is the use of the ill-gotten information or the
fear of its use that must be countered. This is quite different
from cases such as Glasser and United States v. Venuto.57 In
Glasser the court, over defendant's objections, required counsel
for the defendant to represent a co-defendant with possible
conflicting interests. In Venuto the question was one of depriva-
tion of the right to consult counsel during an eighteen hour
recess. Neither of these cases involved the acquiring of informa-
tion by exploitation of the attorney-client relationship, but in-
stead are direct impediments to the effective assistance of
counsel.
Intrusion cases pose a different type of threat to the right to
effective assistance of counsel than do cases such as Glasser
and Venuto. This difference makes it apparent that a more
51. Id. at 75-76.
52. 62 Wash. 2d 371, 382 P.2d 1019 (1963).
53. Id. at 377, 382 P.2d 1022, 1023. In reaching its conclusion the court was
analyzing inter alia, Coplon and Caldwell, see n. 16 supra. Whether they would
advocate the same results in cases of unintentional intrusion is not indicated.
54. 97 S. Ct. at 848 (dissenting opinion).
55. Id.
56. Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26, 28 (1966).
57. 182 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1950).
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appropriate rule to control this threat is needed. Analysis of the
Court's response to the intrusion threat to the sixth amendment
must be undertaken in light of the operation of the other perti-
nent rules in the area. It is established that where the right to a
fair retrial would be prejudiced by information obtained in the
intrusion, dismissal of charges should be ordered. 58 Where the
rule requiring a showing of prejudice, disclosure or intent would
not require a new trial, if, from the facts, it appears that justice
requires a new trial, the court may afford the accused that
opportunity. 59 Finally, the presence of illicit evidence would
make applicable by analogy the rules pertaining to the dis-
covery and exclusion of such evidence in subsequent actions.6
0
In operation, whenever a court finds intentional intrusion into.
defense councils without intent to exploit, the court would re-
mand the case for a new trial. If it appeared that the prosecution
had insinuated itself into the defense to such an extent as to
make problematic the fairness of a retrial, a dismissal would be
ordered. In those cases the Court's rule does not differ from the
per se rule in its results and its ability to preclude the harmful
effects of intrusion. As noted in the dissent of Weatherford, the
burden of proving the intent is not without its problems,61 but
cases such as the District of Columbia Circuit's Coplan v.
United States62 and Caldwell v. United States63 do show the
plausibility of producing such proof. Where unintentional intru-
sion is shown, the court would determine the extent and nature
and make an evidentiary determination as well as a determina-
tion as to the loss of tactical advantage. It would then dismiss
the charges if it found that the unintentional intrusion had been
excessive; declare a mistrial or remand for a new trial, if it
found that any information had been used by the prosecution or
that justice would best be served by this course of action; con-
tinue to a verdict or deny a new trial if no prejudice was found.
These determinations would prevent the use of leads in obtain-
ing evidence and the use of any tactical advantage by the prose-
58. Hoffa v. United States, 385-U.S. 293, 308 (1966); Caldwell v. United
States, 205 F.2d 879, 881-882 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
59. Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26, 28-29 (1966).
60. See generally, Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
61. 97 S. Ct. at 849.
62. 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952).
63. 205 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
cution where it could be proved. In preventing the use of infor-
mation gained through intrusion on defense preparation, the
possible "chill" on the client's willingness to make full disclos-
ure should be eliminated.
The per se rule would certainly be more effective than the
Supreme Court rule in alleviating the defendant's burden of
proof. The trade off, however, does not justify the application of
the per se rule. As the Court pointed out, the per se rule would
require an informant to refuse to attend attorney-client meet-
ings with his supposed confederates. This would have the effect
of disclosing his identity.64 It would also require that legal eaves-
dropping in furtherance of unrelated investigations be ter-
minated for fear of overhearing part of a discussion between
the accused and his counsel. The strong policy in favor of under-
cover work in effective law enforcement and continued secrecy
after arrest as recognized by the Court,6 5 would suffer.
The per se rule, in finding a violation of the sixth amendment
even without a realistic possibility of prejudice goes beyond the
scope of federal authority. Application of a per se rule by federal
courts could be required by the Supreme Court in the exercise of its
oversight authority. To exact such a standard of state courts, how-
ever, would be an undue hindrance of state investigatory powers.66
The case of intrusion into the councils of the defense is more
analogous to fourth amendment eavesdropping than it is to
other denial of right to the effective assistance of counsel cases
such as Powell v. Alabama.6 7 The harm to be guarded against is
the illegal acquisition of information. Rules for precluding this
danger have been well developed in the fourth amendment set-
ting.68 The per se rule, while required where the effective assist-
ance of counsel is hampered as in Powell, Glasser and Venuto,
is out of place in the setting of Weatherford.
The right to consult privately with counsel is central to the
right of effective assistance of counsel. Like all rights, however,
it is not an absolute and must operate within limits. In arriving
at the rule requiring intent or prejudice in invasion of the coun-
64. 97 S. Ct. at 844; see also n.12 supra.
65. 97 S. Ct. at 844-845 citing United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432
(1973); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206,208-209 (1966); and Roviaro v. United
States, 353 U.S. 53, 59, 62 (1957).
66. Id. at 845.
67. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
68. See, the Omnibus Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2518
(8)(d) which provides for informing subjects of wire taps.
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cils of the defense, the Court took a flexible approach in re-
sponse to the distinct threat to the sixth amendment. Analysis
indicates that it will prove to be a viable safeguard.
MINIMIZING THE DETRIMENTAL IMPACT ON THE DEFENSE
The problems posed to the defendant by the Court's ruling are
not insurmountable. The fact that means of overcoming these
problems are available to the courts through the exercise of
judicial discretion provides additional justification for the re-
quirement of intent, disclosure, or tainted evidence.
The problem of possible police perjury is, of course, not
unique to the sixth amendment. The obstacles this problem
presents to the exclusionary rule are extremely serious.69 The
direct involvement of the legal profession in the form of the
prosecution, however, would provide a basis upon which to
hope for an even smaller probability of perjured testimony. A
logical method of decreasing the burden on the defense in cases
where the government has unwittingly or out of the necessities
of law enforcement intruded on the lawyer-client relationship
can be arrived at by operation of the exclusionary rule with the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.70 Since any exploitation
of the lawyer-counsel relation would be unconstitutional, the
existence of an intrusion would be equivalent to an illegal
search or an unconstitutionally acquired confession. Unless the
prosecution could carry the burden of proving an independent
source7' or that the causal connection was so tenuous as to
"dissipate the taint"7 2 the evidence should be excluded. Placing
the burden on the prosecution to prove the propriety of its
evidence is certainly warranted since it is the needs of the public
for law enforcement or the unintended intrusion of the inves-
tigators acting for the government which cause the production
of the tainted evidence.
69. See, Grano, A Dilemma for Defense Counsel: Spinelli-Harris Search
Warrants and the Possibility of Police Perjury, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 405; and
Sevilla, The Exclusionary Rule and Police Perjury, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 839
(1974).
70. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920), and
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
71. 251 U.S. at 392.
72. 308 U.S. at 341.
SUMMARY
The Court's ruling is a viable compromise between the re-
quirement for effective assistance of counsel and the threat
posed by the intrusion on that relationship. The defense attor-
ney faces a potential problem with the burden of proof. To
prevent the necessities of investigatorial practices from unduly
hampering the defense and the attorney-client relationship, lib-
eral relief should be granted within the framework 'provided by
the Supreme Court. It is urged'that the burden 'of proof be
allocated in such a manner as to minimize the detriment to the
defendant.
PAUL H. Voss
